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THE EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED ACT:
HOW WELL DOES IT ACCOMPLISH ITS GOAL
OF PROMOTING THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE
ENVIRONMENT FOR EDUCATION?
Darvin L. Miller*
Marilee A. Miller**
Handicapped children historically have been educated in special pro-
grams separate from the regular programs. The current trend, however, is
to "mainstream" a child with learning disabilities into the "least restrictive
environment" of the regular classroom. The Education for All Handi-
capped Act, Public Law 94-142, attempts to embody this principle by placing
a handicapped child in the regular education system if assimilation is pos-
sible. Inherent in the Act itself, however, are structural weaknesses which
frustrate the goals of mainstreaming. The authors focus on the deficient
labeling techniques, the inefficient funding mechanisms, and the adminis-
trative problems in implementing a cohesive educational systen. Sugges-
tions for rectifying these various weaknesses are also offered.
Special education as a subdelivery system 0 of regular education emerged
somewhat simultaneously with the development of special classes during the
early part of this century. Since most states had institutions to care for se-
verely and profoundly handicapped individuals, it was the lesser handi-
capped population that the public schools were obliged to serve in local com-
munities. Most school districts first attempted to educate these children in
regular classroom settings. However, teachers expected them to learn at the
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Programs in Exceptional Education in the School of Education, University of Wisconsin-Stevens
Point. B.A., 1952, Westmar College; M.P.S., 1961, University of Colorado; Ed.D., 1970, Ball
State University; post-doctoral study, 1973, University of Minnesota. President of the Wisconsin
Division of Early Childhood/Council for Exceptional Children and Chairman of the First State
Conference on Early Childhood-Handicapped; member of the Planning Committee for the An-
nual State Conference, Wisconsin Council for Exceptional Children; member of the Z-Group
and Subcommittee for Writing Standards on State Teacher Preparation in Exceptional Educa-
tion; member of the State Advisory Committee for the Early Childhood: Exceptional Educa-
tional Needs Project, Department of Public Instruction; President, Board of Directors, Sunburst
Youth Homes, Neillsville, Wisconsin.
** Recently completed tenure as law clerk to Chief Justice Allan G. Shepard, Idaho Supreme
Court; presently associated with Rawlins, Ellis, Burrus & Kiewit, Phoenix, Arizona. B.A., 1974,
Indiana University; J.D., 1977, University of Wisconsin.
0. The term "delivery system" is used throughout this Article to refer to the structure for
the delivery of education to students. The term "subdelivery system" is a derivative of that
concept, meaning a portion of that system having a specific identity as a substructure. The
terminology implicitly suggests that education is a commodity or tangible quantity that the
school system through its structure (a delivery system) delivers to the recipient. That recipient is
like a purchaser, or the designated beneficiary of the purchaser (tax-paying parent).
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same rate as other children and retained them until they could pass grade-
level work. Repeated failures and accompanying behavioral problems of these
children caused school officials to search for more satisfactory placements.
The special classroom placement was perceived as the most viable option.
Children were categorized with respect to their particular learning prob-
lems' and placed in distinct classrooms. Such categorical designations of
learning problems in special education were then codified on a state-by-state
basis through legislation. This legislation took two forms: (1) that which de-
fined special education for purposes of specific state reimbursement to those
districts providing such services, and (2) that which related to mandatory
education of the handicapped. 2
The removal of handicapped children from the regular classroom initiated
a trend which fostered dichotomous educational systems for non-
handicapped children and those children with special educational needs. The
development of these two distinct educational systems apexed in the
1950's and 1960's with the establishment of the Council for Exceptional
Children, a professional organization, and The Bureau of Education for the
Handicapped, a unit of the Federal government. Similar developments
simultaneously occurred at state and local levels. State federations of the
Council for Exceptional Children, as well as local and/or regional chapters,
were organized. Divisions for handicapped children and departments of spe-
1. The first major thrust was to establish special classes for mentally retarded children.
There were also some classes for visual- and hearing-impaired children, as well as for children
with speech defects and physical or orthopedic problems. Children exhibiting behavioral devia-
tions were either placed in special classes with retarded children because their behavioral dis-
turbances resulted in low academic performance, or they faced severe disciplinary measures
while remaining in regular classrooms.
The primary criteria used to place children in special classes for the retarded were poor
academic achievement and low scores on intelligence tests (e.g., Stanford-Binet). Regular
classroom teachers were quite willing to have these lesser achieving children, often behavioral
problem children as well, removed from their classrooms and placed elsewhere. On occasion,
some teachers also were eager to send additional borderline children, i.e., those not having the
prerequisite low IQ, to special classrooms.
The special class placement concept grew in popularity, and classes in additional special
categories of children (e.g., visually impaired, hearing impaired, and physically/orthopedically
handicapped) were developed. Then, a division of the mentally retarded population occurred,
referred to as "educable mentally retarded" and "trainable mentally retarded," based on the
severity of retardation. Thus, the more severely retarded children remained in local com-
munities to be served by local school districts rather than being referred to state institutions.
Following World War II, the terms "special education classes" and "special education
teacher" became widely accepted in reference to classes and teachers of the mentally handi-
capped. Soon, however, those terms referred to classes and teachers of all types of special
education programs, with the specific categorical name attached. This practice has prevailed to
the present day.
2. B. GEARHEART & M. WEISHAHN, THE HANDICAPPED CHILD IN THE REGULAR CLASS-
ROOM 9 (1976). Examples of state legislation are: COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-20-101 to 114 (1973);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.041 (1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 120.17 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 59-01 to -09 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2942-54 (1978).
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cial education were developed at the state department and local district
levels. Thus, a complete organizational and administrative structure was es-
tablished to manage a separate system which operated independently of the
regular school system with respect to professional preparation, certification,
implementation of programs, and allocation of funding resources. 3
More recently, however, educators and legislators alike have become
aware of the problems inherent in this dual educational structure. As a re-
sult, the most recent legislative effort, The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, Public Law 94-142, 4 purports to put an end to the
distinction between special education and regular classroom placements. The
Act grants each handicapped child the right to a free, appropriate education.
3. Legislation supported the establishment of special education in the state departments of
education and school districts across the nation. Examples of such legislation are: Act of Sept. 6,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-926, 72 Stat. 1777 (an act encouraging the education of mentally retarded
children through grants to institutions and state educational agencies); Mental Retardation
Facilities & Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164,
77 Stat. 282 (an act providing assistance in mental retardation education through grants for
construction of community mental health centers and research centers as well as grants for other
facilities for the mentally retarded); Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (an act strengthening and improving the quality and opportunities within
elementary and secondary schools); Education Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380,
88 Stat. 484 (an act amending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 which also
includes topics such as transportation of students, federal programs and their impact, the na-
tional reading improvement program, etc.); The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1402, 1411-20 (1976) (an act providing educational assistance to all
handicapped children which also includes state plans, procedural safeguards, judicial review,
etc.).
4. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1402,
1411-20 (1976), has as its purpose:
to assure that all handicapped children have available to them . . . a free appro-
priate public education which emphasizes special education and related services de-
signed to meet their unique needs . ...
20 U.S.C. § 1401. The Act establishes procedural safeguards as well as
procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped chil-
dren, including children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are
educated with children who are not handicapped . ...
20 U.S.C. § 1412. The Act also provides that the Commission can measure and evaluate the
impact of the program as well as the effectiveness of state efforts to assure the free appropriate
public education of all handicapped children. 20 U.S.C. § 1418.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a .550-.551 (1978).
The authors have identified whether a particular educational setting would be considered
restrictive as follows:
In other words, an institutional setting or home for the handicapped is more restric-
tive than a segregated class or handicapped day school. Similarly, having a special
education teacher come into the regulai classroom at various times to help the
handicapped child or segregating the child for certain periods is less restrictive than
segregated classes for the handicapped only. The handicapped child miust be placed
in a program that is as close to a regular education as possible, without denying him
the special assistance he needs to achieve an optimal education.
Miller & Miller, The Handicapped Child's Civil Rights as It Relates to the "Least Restrictive
Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L. J. 1, 3 n. 11 (1978).
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It specifies that such a right demands public education in the "least restric-
tive environment."-5  The child must be placed in an educational environ-
ment that is as close to the regular classroom setting as possible in order to
maximize the child's individual learning ability.
It is the purpose of this Article to outline the progress of special educa-
tion which has led to its present position of "mainstreaming" 6 children into
the regular classroom, despite their special needs. The influence of the
courts and legislatures upon the development of special education will be
examined. This Article will focus on Public Law 94-142, which represents
the trend toward the "least restrictive environment." The Act's effectiveness
in accomplishing the elimination of the dichotomous educational systems will
be analyzed. Finally, the Article will explore the extent to which some of the
state laws have eliminated or retained the problems inherent in Public Law
94-142.
The Least Restrictive Environment and the Retreat from the Separate
Educational System for the Handicapped
Historically, the states have had primary control of public education. 7
State finding of education for the handicapped followed logically from the
precedent of spending state monies for general public education. 8 The qual-
5. "Least restrictive environment" means "that to the maximum extent appropriate, hand-
icapped children are educated with children who are not handicapped, and that removal of
handicapped children from the regular education environment occurs only when the nature or
severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary
aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,972 (1976).
6. Mainstreaming is the educational concept of putting the handicapped child back into the
"mainstream" of regular education, i.e., the handicapped child is put into the regular classroom
with individual attention or supportive services. Mainstreaming is the appropriate method for
putting a large number of handicapped students into the "least restrictive environment."
7. The states still have primary control of public education, but the trend is toward in-
creased funding from the federal government for both general financing and special program
financing, in particular. However, there is a trend toward more local control in the area of
curriculum:
... Since education is a state function, the primary responsibility for financing the
public schools rests with the state. The state may, if it sees fit, provide all or most
of the funds itself, or it may delegate much or all of the responsibility for financing
public schools to the local school districts.
The Federal Government and School Support. - While the federal govern-
ment is not primarily responsible for the administration and support of public
schools, its financial contribution to education is gradually increasing.
L. GARBER & E. REUT'rER, JR., THE YEARBOOK OF SCHOOL LAw-1969, 151, 153 (1969). See
generally R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 147-74 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as SCHOOL FINANCE].
8. In 1971-72, "[s]tate governments provided 39 percent of the money used to support
public elementary and secondary schools ...... SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 7, at 7. State cases
challenging the spending of portions of the state taxes on public education preceded the federal
cases determining the constitutionality of such spending.
In Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 53 S.W. 962 (1899), it was determined that schools
were state agencies and that education was a state function. Thirteen years later the New
[Vol. 28:321
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itative expansion to encompass education of the handicapped was consistent
with longitudinal growth of education which raised the age of compulsory
education and the latitudinal growth of education which expanded the cur-
riculum. 9
A separate delivery system was developed for handicapped children in
response to society's belief that the child's failure to learn was not the fault
of the educational program but of the deficiencies within the child. Early
attempts to integrate special students into regular school programs and cur-
riculum occurred in the 1950's. These efforts were termed "progressive in-
Hampshire Supreme Court in Fogg v. Board of Educ., 76 N.H. 296, 82 A. 173 (1912), upheld
the state government's right to tax to maintain a system of public schools. The state not only had
the right, but also the duty, to provide public schools in order to develop intelligent citizens and to
promote the social order and peace of society. Id. at 299, 82 A. at 174-75. Cochran v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930), was an action to restrain the Louisiana Board of Educa-
tion from providing free textbooks to its students. The Louisiana legislature promulgated a law
to provide for free textbooks, and the United States Supreme Court upheld it. Logically,
textbooks provide access to or aid a free public education. Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court
acknowledged federal power to use tax monies for public education.
The Court in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), upheld the Social Security Act,
which provided funds for public programs in the same way that funds are provided for public
education. The Court reasoned that although there was nothing explicit in the Constitution for
public programs, Congress has thepower to tax and spend for the general welfare under the
general welfare clause, article one, section eight, of the United States Constitution. Impli-
cations from this case provide the basis for public educational spending. United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936), also referred to the fact that the Federal Constitution doesn't mention such
taxing and spending power. In that case, the Court found the Agricultural Adjustment Act
unconstitutional, and its discussion of Congress' taxation power has similar implications for edu-
cation. Generally, however, Congress' power to tax and spend is limited in that it can only be
exercised to provide for the general welfare. See L. GABBER & N. EDWARDS, THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL IN OUR GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE 14-86 (1962).
Authority to Tax for School Purposes. - A state legislature, in the absence of
some constitutional restriction, has plenary power with respect to the financing of
the state's educational system. The state may act through direct legislative enact-
ments or it may delegate its authority with respect to school finance to such local
units of government as school districts, counties, or municipalities....
School taxes are state taxes even though they have been levied and collected
by a school district or a municipality. And since education is a state and not a local
or municipal function, school districts, counties, or municipalities may be required
without their consent to levy taxes for school purposes ....
L. GARBER & N. EDWARDS, THE LAW GOVERNING THE FINANCING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
3 (1964).
9. "Longitudinal growth" refers to the increasing age span of compulsory education. The
child today starts his public education earlier and ends it later. Public kindergartens, on the one
hand, and the availability of publicly supported higher education (either college or vocational),
on the other hand, are now quite common. The Act recognizes the importance of the increasing
length of public education by referring to the public educational programs in some states for
children 3 to 5 years of age. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411, 1412 (1976).
"Latitudinal growth" refers to the expansion of subjects and types of educational experi-
ences which are to become a part of public education. Industrial arts, home economics, foreign
languages, music, and physical education joined the three "H's" in the curriculum. This latitudi-
nal growth appeared at the time special education classes were developed.
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clusion," but it was not until 1962 that emphasis was placed on developing
programs for the handicapped in settings either within or approximating the
regular classroom. 10 Several years later, in 1967, the United States Office of
Education held a conference at the University of Maryland to discuss and
appraise the "special education" system. As a result, attention was directed
toward "the problems of categorization, the degrading effects of labeling, the
fallacies of the placement system, the misuse of the traditional predictive
model, and the rejection-oriented service delivery system of' special educa-
tion." x
At the close of the 1960's, evidence accumulated which indicated segre-
gated special class programs were not effective and that such programs could
not be educationally justified.' 2  Lawsuits arose which challenged the special
education system to take a serious look at itself 13 and resolve the handi-
capped child's right to education. A few notable cases, representative of early
suits initiated to ensure handicapped children access to a public education,
illustrate a lack of uniformity among the states in education of the handi-
capped. Several cases affirmed the obligation of school systems to provide spe-
10. Reynolds, A Proposed Conceptual Framework for Special Education, THE PROCESS OF
SPECIAL EDUCATION ADMINISTRATION (1970). The framework has become known as the cascade
of services-a delivery-of-services model for children with special needs. It is a system that is
geared toward tailoring treatment to individual needs from the least restrictive educational envi-
ronment, the regular classroom, to the most restrictive environment, the hospital or other
domiciled setting. The system is flexible and fosters movement of the child with special needs
toward less restrictive environments over time.
11. Meisgeier, A Review of Critical Issues Underlying Mainstreaming, THE THIRD RE-
VIEW OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 247 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Meisgeier]. It was at that confer-
ence that Reynolds drew attention to the increasingly deteriorating dividing points between
regular and special education. See generally Maryland Special Study Institute, stenographic
transcript, Ace-Federal Reporters, Washington, D.C. (1967) (Reynolds segment).
12. See Dunn, Special Education for the Mildly Retarded-Is Much of It Justifiable?, 35
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 5 (1968).
13. One of the earliest cases to question the appropriateness of the educational setting was
State ex rel. Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153 (1919). The board of educa-
tion precipitated the case by transferring the child from the public school to a school for the
instruction of deaf persons and persons with speech impairments. The action was brought to
force the board to return the child to the regular school because he had perfect hearing, no
speech problem, and at least average intelligence. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the
board's transfer because of the child's other physical impairments. He had paralysis affecting his
whole physical and nervous system, so use of his voice, hands, feet, and body were not normal.
Thus, he could be characterized as having a speech impairment. Furthermore, he experienced
uncontrollable facial contortions and drooled, which bothered the teacher and students. The
court states that the board had the power to decide whether the disruption affecting the educa-
tion of the other students was sufficient reason to deny the handicapped child's constitutional
right. It concluded that the board did not exceed its discretion in doing so. See also Watson v.
City of Cambridge, 157 Mass. 561, 32 N.E. 864 (1893); West v. Board of Trustee, 41 Ohio App.
367, 181 N.E. 144 (1931).
See also DENO, SPECIAL EDUCATION AS DEVELOPMENTAL CAPITAL 229 (1971). Deno for
many years has challenged the procedure of categorizing special children in order to provide
programs for them. He believes that it has deterred appropriate educational programming for
special children.
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cial classes for the mentallyl 4 and physically handicapped.' 5  Other cases
established the state's responsibility to reimburse private institutions for serv-
ices provided to exceptional children for whom no appropriate public school
placements were available. 16
14. For example, in Hines v. Board of Educ., 170 Misc. 745, 10 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1939), the City
of New York was challenged on whether it had met its statutory obligation to provide special
classes adapted to education of the mentally handicapped. The court determined that the 170
special classes for the mentally handicapped met that obligation. In a later case, Elgin v. Silver,
15 Misc. 2d 864, 182 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1958), parents of a 17-year-old mentally handicapped child
sought to compel the New York City Board of Education to provide education for mentally
handicapped children until they reached age 21. The court construed a new 1957 statute to
mean that the school board had to provide education for mentally handicapped children but only
until age 17. Education until age 21 was only mandatory when a child could profit from educa-
tion beyond age 17.
15. For example, in Schutte v. Decker, 164 Neb. 582, 83 N.W.2d 69 (1957), the Nebraska
court addressed the obligations of a local school district to educate a physically handicapped
child. A state statute required the board of education to budget for each handicapped child at
least as much as was budgeted for non-handicapped children. The statute provided for excess
cost reimbursement, to an extent, from state funds. The act guaranteeing the education of
physically and mentally handicapped children was separate and independent from the other
state acts dealing with education. The court decided that if a school district complied with the
statute, then by definition it met its obligations.
Esposito v. Barber, 74 N.J. Super. 289, 181 A.2d 201 (1962), was grounded on a state
statute providing for the education of mentally handicapped and physically handicapped chil-
dren. The court ruled that the school board did have to provide the plaintiff child with speech
therapy suited to his individual needs. See generally E. FULBRIGHT & E. BOLMEIER, COURTS
AND THE CURRICULUM 33-36 (1964) (expanding the school to include provisions for the physi-
cally and mentally handicapped).
16. For example, Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy, 352 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961),
dealt with a state statute authorizing public aid to private institutions. Those institutions were
reimbursed for educating "exceptional children," defined for statutory purposes as children who
would be entitled to public education if appropriate programs and facilities were available, but
who the State Board of Education determined should go to private institutions because of the
inadequacy of the local school.
Butler stands in sharp contrast to an earlier Illinois case in which a father sued to collect for the
costs of his son's education in a state mental institution. Department of Public Welfare v. Haas, 15
Ill. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265 (1958), a case decided only 20 years ago, left the financial burden
on the father. The Illinois Supreme Court did recognize public education as a'constitutional
right, but it limited that right to educable children, concluding that the son in question didn't
meet that standard. See also In re Peter H, 66 Misc. 2d 1097, 323 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1971). In this
case the mother of a physically handicapped boy sought reimbursement for the tuition costs of
sending him to a nonpublic special educational facility. The family court granted reimburse-
ment.
The court in In re Leitner, 40 App. Div. 2d 38, 337 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1972), spoke critically of
the state fiscal bureaucracy for special educational services:
The procedure by which the New York Family Court can order special educational
services and allocate the cost of those services is "at best, cumbersome, and at
worst, unclear and unnecessarily complex."
Id. at 42, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 272. The court went on to explain that the New York Constitution
outlines the general jurisdiction of the Family Court and section 232 of the Family Court Act
gives the court jurisdiction over special education training of mentally handicapped children. Id.
Normally the state and county split the cost when it's not provided by parents, guardians, local
authorities, or other sources. In addition, there is a New York voucher system providing for
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Even though the trend in the case law acknowledged some form of state
responsibility to the handicapped, the quality of this educational effort was
not fully explored until Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Pennsylvania (PARC)17 and Mills v. Board of Education. 18 Both cases re-
such payments. D. KIRP & M. YODOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 714-17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as EDUCATIONAL POLICY].
A more recent case involving the education of the handicapped is Levine v. New Jersey
Dep't of Institutions & Agencies, 4 Fed. L. Rep. 2650 (July 14, 1978). In Levine parents con-
tended that the state was constitutionally obligated to provide for the cost of 24-hour custodial
care for their severely brain-damaged child. Their theory was that the care would be "educa-
tional services." The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, rejected the theory. Al-
though the state must provide a thorough and efficient education to all children, there was no
denial of equal protection in Levine. There is a distinction between services that are educational
in nature and those that involve total custodial care and maintenance in a state institution. The
handicapped child in Levine needed custodial, not educational services.
17. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). This decision upheld a stipulation and consent
agreement which required a hearing before a retarded child could be removed from regular
classes. It also provided that the excess instruction costs would be paid by the state. Id. at 301.
PARC sought public education for handicapped children in the categories that had been
totally excluded from the schools. Those children categorized as "uneducable" or "unable to
profit" from further education from the public school system had been totally excluded. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1375, -1330 (1972). The Pennsylvania Code also allowed exclusion of
handicapped children who had not reached the mental age of 5 years or who were not within
the compulsory school age span of 8-17 years. Id. §§ 13-1304 to -1326. The final decision did
touch on the concept of the least restrictive alternative:
It is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a free,
public program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity, within
the context of the general educational policy that among the alternative programs of
education and training required by statute to be available, placement in a regular
public school class is preferable to placement in a special public school class and
placement in a special public school class is preferable to placement in any other
type of program of education and training.
343 F. Supp. at 307.
18. 348 F. Supp. 866 ().D.C. 1972). The court stated:
Each member of the plaintiff class is to be provided with a publicly-supported edu-
cational program suited to his needs, within the context of a presumption that
among the alternative programs of education, placement in a regular public school
class with appropriate ancillary services is preferable to placement in a special
school class.
348 F. Snpp. at 880.
The District of Columbia public schools even admitted that an estimated 12,340 handi-
capped children were not given a publicly supported special education. Id. at 869. The school
system's scapegoat was the lack of adequate funding for special classes, but it was not acknowl-
edged as a valid excuse. Id. at 876. Each child was considered entitled to a free public educa-
tion.
See M. KINDRED, J. COHEN, D. PENROD & T. SHAFFER, TIlE MENTALLY RETARDED
CITIZEN AND THE LAW 255-67 (1976); L. LIPPMAN & I. GOLDBERG, RIGHT TO EDUCATION;
ANATOMY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
(1973); Comment, Public Instruction to the Learning Disabled: Higher Hurdles for the Hand-
icapped, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 113, 129-33 (1973).
The legal theory to support such decisions as Mills and PARC stems from the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. It was argued that each child should be allotted the same number of tax dollars.
The objective was to equalize monies spent on children in the regular classrooms. The political
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sponded to the developing criticism of separate delivery systems for special
education by establishing the right of handicapped children to a free public
education appropriate to the child's educational needs. Further, they pro-
and litigious pushes came from inequities between property-rich and property-poor school dis-
tricts, between schools with different racial composition, and between urban and rural school
districts.
The basic legal argument was equal protection of the law. Because public education subsists
on public monies, the contention was that it was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution and any comparable clause in state constitutions to favor financially
one student or school group over another. "This means that no state may enforce legislation or
authorize administrative agencies to enforce rules and regulations that discriminate in favor of
one class of citizens as over against another." N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: THE LEGAL BASES OF SCHOOL ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 11 (3d rev. ed.
1955).
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), denounced segregation on the basis of race as
violative of the equal protection clause. It was reinforced by Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), its companion case, which declared racial segregation also violative of the due process
clause. See generally L. GARBER & N. EDWARDS, THE PUBLIC SCHOOL IN OUR GOVERN-
MENTAL STRUCTURE 63-68 (1962). Following from the premise that children of all races were
entitled to the same schools and same education, the advocates argue that all children should be
treated equally, at least financially. The question then becomes whether an equal tax dollar
expenditure results in an equal educational opportunity. Certainly it would be an easy yardstick
to look at objective statistics of expenditures and determine whether every student was being
treated "equally." However, the real goal should be to provide the same actual education or
same opportunity. Just as it costs more to provide a black child an education in an urban rather
than primarily white suburban setting, it costs more to educate a handicapped child with more
educational needs. See generally SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 7.
Thus, one can follow the progress made in securing comparable funding and comparable
educational opportunities for children of different races, geographical, and financial areas. One
can then analogize to the progress that has been made on behalf of handicapped children in
securing equal educational opportunities. Because the latter movement is not as far along, one
might use the former movement for purposes of projection. There is an analogous increase in
community control (the "communitarian impulse"). EDUCATIONAL POLICY, supra note 16, at
307-46 (equal educational opportunity and race; description of community control). Other
analogies include sex-based discrimination as it applies to equal educational opportunities and
educational resources. Id. at 490-643. The bottom-line analogy, though, is one of integration. It
was determined that children of different races were entitled to education in the same schools
and classrooms. The concept of mainstreaming similarly concludes that children of different
learning capacities and physical abilities are entitled to education in the same schools and class-
rooms to the maximum extent possible. Id. at 717.
See also P. ADAMS, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: TOWARDS THE LIBERATION OF THE CHILD
(1971); W. BUCKLEY, FOUR REFORMS - A GUIDE FOR THE SEVENTIES (1973); G. COLLINS,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR STATE ACTION IN EDUCATION (1968); J. COONS,
W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970); L. GARBER,
CURRENT LEGAL CONCEPTS IN EDUCATION (1966) (Symposium on School Law); N. NAG, W.
AYERS, N. SULLIVAN, H. KOHL & M. FANTINI, IMPLEMENTING EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 138 (1968); J. GUTHRIE, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY (1971); M. LOUGHERY, PA-
RENTAL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL LAW: THEIR BASES AND IMPLEMENTATION (1952);
P. MERANTO, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION IN 1965: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
INNOVATION (1967); J. SLY, FINANCING EDUCATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1956) (Sym-
posium Conducted by the Tax Institute, Nov. 3-4, 1955); STATE COMM'N ON THE QUALITY,
COST & FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY & SECONDARY EDUCATION, THE FLEISCHMANN REPORT
ON THE QUALITY, COST, AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION IN
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moted this right to an appropriate education in the least restrictive environ-
ment. These cases not only were the impetus for similar lawsuits in other
states, 19 but ultimately formed the foundation for Public Law 94-142, which
mandates uniform implementation of these principles throughout the states.
Although the Act requires that an appropriate education be delivered in
the least restrictive environment,2 0 it contains features which tend to per-
petuate the dual approach to the distribution of educatibnal services. Some
of the most significant deterrents to collaborative programming by the spe-
cial and regular education systems are: control of resources by special educa-
tion, categorical labels for the handicapped, traditional essentialist cur-
riculum in regular education, and teacher preparation. A delineation of each
of these barriers follows.
PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF RESOURCES
BY SPECIAL EDUCATION
Perhaps one of the most significant barriers to promotion of the least re-
strictive environment and collaborative programming, especially with respect
to services provided by the regular classroom, is the method by which state
and federal funds are appropriated for educating the handicapped. At the
state level, legislatures distribute educational funds for the handicapped
through special education bureaus or divisions. At the federal level, Con-
NEW YORK STATE (1973); NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION,
CRITICAL ISSUES IN SCHOOL LAW (1970); R. ORTNAN, THE RIGHT TO BE EDUCATED: STUDIES
TO COMMEMORATE THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED NA-
TIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DECEMBER 10, 1948 (1968).
Beyond pure analogy, it should be noted that gaining larger fiscal shares not only bene-
fitted students of particular races or poor geographic areas, but there also was an automatic ben-
efit to the "harder to educate," such its the handicapped, by virtue of the higher incidence of
these students in those categories. See SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 7, at 65 (Table 4-3 and
accompanying text).
19. PARC was cited as support in the following cases: Larionoff v. United States, 553 F.2d
1167 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Muskegon Theatres, Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 507 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.
1974); Nickerson v. Thomson, 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974); Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hospital, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Taylor v. Maryland School for the
Blind, 409 F. Supp. 148 (D. Md. 1976). Mills v. Board of Educ. was cited as support in the
following cases: Panitch v. State of Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Cuyahoga
County Ass'n for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976);
Frederick v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson
County Transit Authority, 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 333,
339 A.2d 193 (1975).
20.
(1) That to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children, including chil-
dren in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with chil-
dren who are not handicapped, and
(2) That special classes, separate schooling or other removal of handicapped chil-
dren from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or
severity of the handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.550(b)(1), (2) (1978).
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gress allows the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped within the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare to oversee the appropriations. In
both cases, the resources provided are designated largely for tile special
education delivery system, which generally controls its own distribution of
finds. As a result, less funds are available to the regular education system,
despite the fact that it is required to provide services to handicapped chil-
dren as well.
Since Public Law 94-142 requires that collaborative programming be pro-
vided for handicapped children, regular and special education must therefore
share resources in order to provide all children with an educational envi-
ronment which is appropriate to their individual needs. The regular educa-
tional system must request funds from special education whenever it un-
dertakes to cooperate in the education of the handicapped. Unfortunately,
special education usually utilizes its funds and resources in its own system first
with the balance left to regular education. Thus, the present distribution of
resources does not facilitate the desired fluidity between special education
and regular education programs.
The net result of this practice is that the regular education system must
attempt to meet the mandate of the law without adequate funds. Therefore,
regular education is unable to provide the necessary and costly facilities for
education of the handicapped. The cost of providing smaller classes, teachers
aides, teaching machines, and equipment is in excess of amounts allotted for
regular education. The inability of regular education to obtain these neces-
sary teaching aids is an impediment to the handicapped child's progress.
Thus, while ostensibly fifilling the goal of the least restrictive environment,
the Act does not, in fact, ensure the resources necessary to fulfill its addi-
tional goal of an appropriate and free public education for handicapped chil-
dren. 21 This is the result of the legislation's lack of a requirement that
educational facilities provide an individualized program of education. 22
21. The regulations accompanying the Act are intended:
(1) to assure that all handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate
public education; (2) to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their
parents are protected; (3) to assist States and localities to provide for the education
of handicapped children; and (4) to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate such children.
42 Fed. Reg. 42,474 (1977) (Summary). The goals have aspects of both quality and quantity. The
quality of education means that it must be appropriate, in the least restrictive environment (i.e.,
mainstreaming if possible), and free. The quantity refers to the objective of reaching every child
who can benefit from educational services. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.1 (1978).
22. Under the Act, the providers of educational services are "not held accountable if a child
does not achieve the growth projected in the annual goals and objectives." 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.349 (1977).
The individualized education program (IEP) is a written statement prepared by the local
educational agency representative, the parents, the handicapped child's teacher, and possibly
other professionals, such as a state agency representative. It sets forth the child's level of func-
tioning, instructional objectives, services needed to educate the child, and an evaluation at a
later time to determine whether the instructional goals have been met. It should also contain a
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One area in which funds are available to regular education is in retraining
regular teachers to work with handicapped children. Again, however, the
special education delivery system has control as to how these funds can best
be utilized. Therefore, at a time when regular education is experiencing a
limitation of its budget because of decreasing enrollments and conservative
local taxation measures, it is being asked to serve a new clientele (i.e., hand-
icapped children) without any provision for additional resources. 23  The
Education for All Handicapped Act affects the educational programs in every
state and indirectly the character of the education of each handicapped child
in the United States.2 4 Thus, minor revisions could have major effects to-
ward the resolution of this financing problem.
Unfortunately, the funding mechanism of Public Law 94-142 continues to
distribute funds in the same rigid manner. Federal funds are given to the
state educational agencies 25 which continue to earmark some funds for spe-
statement indicating the degree to which the child can be educated in the regular classroom.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.220-.227 (1978).
The IEP must provide a solid rationale for removing the child from regular education.
Because of typical bureaucratic inertia, it is easier for the representatives of the educational
agency (most likely the local school district) to leave the child in the regular classroom. The
school district can then nominally characterize tl~e child as being "mainstreamed" into the "least
restrictive environment.- The reviewing authority can easily determine on paper whether the
child is in a regular or special class; however, it cannot really determine whether a handicapped
child in a regular class is receiving appropriate individualized instruction and supportive serv-
ices. Yet the school district can collect monies from the federal and state governments for its
mainstreaming, regardless of its quality and educational effectiveness.
23. See BRENTON, MAINSTREAMING THE EDUCABLE MENTALLY RETARDED 13 (1975).
24. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.2 (1978). It is feasible that a state may choose not to seek federal
funds under the Act. Yet the Act speaks in generalities, so its broad applicability is implied.
This optional characteristic of the Act's applicability suggests another crucial reason why the
federal funding under it must be great enough to induce states to voluntarily make themselves
subject to the terms of the Act.
Once a state falls under the purview of the Act, the education of each handicapped child
must meets its standards, at least in theory. The amount of money spent on the child's educa-
tion is controlled, the child becomes entitled to an individualized education program (IEP), and
the parent and child automatically acquire due process rights. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.130, 131,
.500-.534 (1978). One might also argue that because the flow of monies to education of the
handicapped is controlled, the money spent on the education of the "regular" child, whether
derived from state or federal sources, is also affected indirectly. Assuming that the state has a
finite number of tax dollars to distribute, if the federal government requires an increased
number he spent on education of the handicapped, necessarily a decreased number will be
spent on education of nonhandicapped children.
25. In regard to the broad applicability of the Act, one should note that its definition of
"State" includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American
Samoa, the Virginia (sic) Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 42 Fed. Reg. at
42,480, § 121a. 15.
The money comes from the federal government and goes through the state agency to the
local agency. Before the local agency can have and use funds from the federal source, it must
meet the "excess cost requirement." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.182-.183 (1978). Briefly, the excess cost
requirement means that federal funds can only be used for costs in excess of what the local
agency normally spends on the education of a handicapped child. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a. 184-
.193 (1978) (detailed methods of computation for excess costs-minimum amount and
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cial education 26 and other funds for regular education, reinstituting a fund-
ing dichotomy between the two systems. Nothing in the Act compels a trans-
fer of finds from special education to regular education. Once again regular
education is left with inadequate resources to. provide an appropriate educa-
tion for the handicapped children it is required to service.2 7
Subpart B of the Act, which outlines state annual program plans and local
applications, 28 is the most logical portion to revise. The Act should be re-
consolidated application amount). Under no circumstances may federal funds under the statute
be used to replace state funds. However, in the calculation of what constitutes a replacement,
consideration of a lower enrollment of handicapped children and prior, major, long-term expen-
ditures is allowable. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.230 (1978).
The nonsupplarting rule results in at least minor impact on regular education. First, as the
amount of federal funding increases each year, the amount of state funding for education of the
handicapped must increase or at least remain constant. If state educational funds decrease, for
example, in the aftermath of conservative taxpayer voting, regular education funds would be
logically reduced before special education funds. Then federal funds could be retained and the
cumulative loss would be reduced.
Second, if the nonsupplanting rule is strictly construed, funding could not be used to pay
part of the salary of a regular education teacher who teaches handicapped children. The "Com-
ment" to § 121a.230 only states:
Whether a local educational agency supplants with respect to a particular cost
would depend on the circumstances of the expenditure. For example, if a teacher's
salary has been switched from local funding to Part B funding, this would appear to
be supplanting. However, if that teacher was taking over a different position (such
as a resource room teacher), it would not be supplanting.
Id. A liberal construction would take the statement further and conclude that if a regular educa-
tion teacher received in-service training and taught handicapped children in the regular class-
room, part of the teacher's salary could correctly come from the Act's funding as provided by 20
U.S.C. § 1411-20 (1976). However, the strict construction is more likely to be adopted. The
above quotation suggests that a teacher's salary source only changes when the teacher switches
to a new position; a modification of a present position would not be a sufficient basis for a
change in funding source. Yet it is the teacher with the new handicapped students who bears a
major portion of the burden and responsibility of mainstreamed students.
26. With regard to public agencies within the state, the state educational agency submits an
annual program on behalf of the entire state:
Therefore, the provisions of this part apply to all political subdivisions of the State
that are involved in the education of handicapped children. These would include:
(1) The State educational agency, (2) local educational agencies and intermediate
educational units, (3) other State agencies and schools (such as Departments of
Mental Health and Welfare and State schools for the deaf or blind), and (4) State
correctional facilities.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.2(b) (1978). The state schools in particular are grounded in the other theory of
segregation of the handicapped for educational purposes. Special education is far more likely to
get funding from a general "Department of Public Instruction" than regular education is to get
funding from a "Department of Mental Health and Welfare."
27. This statement is derived from the official Comment to § 121a.2:
The requirements of this part are binding on each public agency that has direct or
delegated authority to provide special education and related services in a State that
receives funds under Part B of the Act, regardless of whether that agency is receiv-
ing funds under Part B.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.2 (1978).
28. A state's annual program plan outlines the present program for educating handicapped
children and the plan for the upcoming year, complete with anticipated state expenditures and
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written to require a state to include a description of how funds would be
distributed to regular education services for handicapped children. 29  For
example, if the state's plan failed to provide for funding to regular education,
the Commissioner would have the power to disapprove it. 30  At present, the
Act requires that a state's annual program plan need only provide statistics
as to the number of special class teachers, resource room teachers, and con-
sultant teachers which will be needed. 31 The plan also must state how many
additional ancillary noninstructional personnel are presently employed by
the state and how many more are needed. 32 But there is no provision for
assessing how many regular education teachers serve handicapped children's
educational needs nor how many of these regular education teachers are
needed. 3 3  The only reference to regular classes concerns the physical
facilities used for the education of the handicapped. 34
The most direct method of revising Public Law 94-142, would be to
draft appropriate provisions in the funding segment of the Act. Currently,
anticipated federal expenditures or contributions. It is submitted by the state educational
agency and must be certified by that agency and the state attorney general. 45 C.F.R.
§§ 121a.110-.112 (1978). Local applications are a component of the overall state plan and are di-
rected from the local educational agency to the state educational agency, which in turn directs it
to the federal government. See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.180-.194 (1978).
29. First, the Act could require the state to give a breakdown of where handicapped chil-
dren are placed - particularly how many are placed in regular classes. That datum would fall
into the data requirement in regard to the Act's full educational opportunity goal. 45 C.F.R.
§ 121a.124 (1978).
Second, the Act could require a statistical description of the number of regular education
teachers that are teaching handicapped children. See notes 31-33 infra and accompanying text.
Third, one of the criteria that could be considered in the plan's annual evaluation could be
whether appropriate funding is reaching regular education. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.146 (1978).
Fourth, and most crucial, would be revision of § 121a.149, which requires a description of
how the Part B funds are used. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.149 (1978). Both subsection a and subsection
b could have additional requirements to indicate how the state educational agency and the local
educational agency, respectively, allocated money to regular education to help cover the in-
creased costs due to education of the handicapped.
30. The Commissioner can disapprove any plan that does not meet the stated requirements.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.113(b) (1978). The Commissioner is the responsible agent of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education.
31. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.126(b)(1) (1978).
32. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.126(b)(2) (1978). The list of personnel seems to point to specialists
only, although theoretically additional regular class teachers with some training in education of
mainstreamed children could be fairly cast as "additional personnel."
Another problem created by the extensive list of special education specialists and their
respective departments is the impression that the federal funds will go only to them. No men-
tion is made of regular education, creating the parallel implication that no funds will go toward
that delivery system.
33. This omission strongly suggests that the number of regular classes and classroom
teachers serving handicapped children is not considered by either the state educational agencies
or the Commissioner on behalf of the federal government in determining the practical and
financial needs of the state. Needs of the regular class and classroom teacher are not taken into
consideration and therefore appropriations cannot be made for their needs.
34. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.126(b)(4) (1978).
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the state educational agency shoulders the main responsibility for the educa-
tion of the state's handicapped children. The state, however, merely acts in
a supervisory capacity because it delegates its authority to the local educa-
tional agencies. 35  Accompanying the delegated responsibility is the bulk of
the federal finding.36  The Act should be revised to require a local educa-
tional agency to transfer funds to regular education when it has been dele-
gated the responsibility for education of the handicapped. 37  Furthermore,
primary control of financial resources should be shifted from special educa-
tion to either a joint finding and distribution program or a method of shared
funding based on an objective ratio or other established criteria. 38
35. The regulation provides that:
(a) The State educational agency is responsible for insuring;
(1) That the requirements of this part are carried out; and
(2) That each educational program for handicapped children administered
within the State, including each program administered by any other public agency:
(i) Is tinder the general supervision of the persons responsible for educational
programs for handicapped children in the State educational agency, and
(ii) Meets education standards of the State educational agency (including the
requirements of this part).
(b) The State must comply with paragraph (a) of this section through State
statute, State regulation, signed agreement between respective agency officials, or
other documents.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.600 (1978). See 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.601-.602 (1978).
The official Comment to § 121a.600 explains:
This provision is included specifically to assure a single line of responsibility
with regard to the education of handicapped children, and to assure that in the
implementation of all provisions of this Act and in carrying out the right to educa-
tion for handicapped children, the State educational agency shall be the responsible
agency ...
Without this requirement, there is an abdication of responsibility for the educa-
tion of handicapped children. Presently, in many States, responsibility is divided,
depending upon the age of the handicapped child, sources of funding, and type of
services delivered ...
45 C.F.R. § 121a.600 (1978). As the sources of funding now stand under the Act, responsibility
for handicapped children will probably depend upon where they are placed and whether special
education funds or regular education funds are used for their education.
36. The state is limited to the greater amount of either 5% or $200,000 of the total state
allotment for administrative costs, subject to a maximum of the amount designated in
§§ 121a.704 or 121a.705, the hold harmless provision and the within-state distribution for fiscal
year 1978, respectively. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.620, 704, 705 (1978). It is likely that §§ 121a.705
and 121a.706 were intended to limit each state's allotted amount. They are comparable sec-
tions on within-state distribution, but the former applies to fiscal year 1978 and the latter to
fiscal year 1979 and thereafter. Id. Under § 121a.705, the state can use up to half of the state's
total allocation for named purposes. Section 121a.706 limits the state's potential share to 25%.
Id.
37. A legal duty and a legal right are, most often, reciprocals. Here regular education's duty
to educate certain handicapped students must be supported by the right to a share of federal
funding. Otherwise the handicapped, mainstreamed child's right to a free appropriate public
education (FAPE) will be hollow, indeed. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.360 (1978).
38. For example, the distribution of funding could be according to where the handicapped
children were being educated; if 25% were being educated in the regular classroom, regular
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PROBLEMS IN THE ACT ASSOCIATED WITH
CATEGORICAL LABELS FOR THE HANDICAPPED
Historically, labeling of the handicapped has had an adverse effect on the
quality and appropriateness of education. Special education has received finan-
cial support on the basis of traditional categorical labels for handicapped
children. 39 Each category of learning disabilities has prompted the emergence
of separate citizen and professional organizations, different professional prep-
arations and certifications, unique definitions and standards for treatment,
particular theoretical and applied educational procedures, and special lob-
byists for congressional support of favored bills. When a child is identified
for individual program planning as a handicapped pupil, he must fit one of
the categories in order to obtain these extra services. As a result, many
children who fail to meet the specific criteria outlined in the categories fall
into the gaps between the categories.
The application of labels stigmatizes the children and interferes with their
education. 40  The use of categories directs attention to the child as the root
of the problem, rather than encouraging individual student instruction.
Labels are often used to justify academic failure and thus restrict the explo-
ration of methods and materials which could be used more effectively to
teach a child. They perpetuate stereotypes and myths concerning various
types of exceptionalities, not only in the eyes of the public, but also in the
perceptions of regular classroom teachers. Furthermore, labels discourage
discussion between regular and special educators concerning the unique
learning capacities and needs of each child. Thus, regular and special
educators are prevented from pooling their resources and expertise to pro-
vide more acceptable programs that meet the specific needs of handicapped
children. 4 '
education would be entitled to at least 25% of the federal funds. It should be noted that a strict
split would not be equitable. Initially, the regular classroom education would require a higher
share of funds than it would normally need. Like any new business or enterprise, education of
the handicapped in the regular classroom would entail certain start-up costs. Those costs would
include expenditures (capital outlay) for new physical items and materials, retraining for the
regular class teacher (personnel cost), and lower productivity (decreased profits and production)
and efficiency during the trial period of adjustment.
On the other hand, special education would need more per child for its educational serv-
ices, because its physical facilities would be more expensive. In addition, special education
would have the students with the more severe handicaps, who necessarily require more educa-
tional funding.
39. The Act defines "special education" as:
... [S]pecially designed instruction, at no cost to the parent, to meet the unique
needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instrution in physical
education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.14 (1978).
40. See generally Goldstein, Arkell, Ashcroft, Hurley & Lilly, Schools, ISSUES IN THE CLAS-
SIFICATION OF CItILDREN (1975).
41. See Klein, Least Restrictive Alternative: An Educational Analysis, 13 EDUCATION &
TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY RErARDED 102, 106 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Klein].
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Unfortunately, the Act perpetuates these problems by its own listings of
categorical handicaps. Again, the impression arises that the federal funds will
go only to the enumerated handicaps. This impression is verified by an
analysis of the Act itself.42 For example, outside the physically handicapped
classification, the category of "seriously emotionally disturbed" 43 is not
broad enough to encompass all children with learning disabilities.44 There
is a strong possibility that the existing categorical definition will not encom-
pass all children with physical disabilities.4 5
Instead Public Law 94-142 should define "handicapped children" accord-
ing to their needs, or at least their learning problems, rather than by tradi-
tional labels of physical or psychological problems.4 6  These labels do not
42. The definition of "handicapped children" is finite in its parameters. Only the children
that meet the definition get the benefits and protection of the Act. The definition of "handi-
capped children" includes only "those children evaluated in accordance with §§ 121a.530-
121a.534 as being mentally retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicap-
ped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, other health impaired, deaf-
blind, multi-handicapped, or as having specific learning disabilities, who because of those im-
pairments need special education and related services." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(a) (1978).
43. "Seriously emotionally disturbed" is defined as follows:
(i) The term means a condition exhibiting one or more of the following charac-
teristics over a long period of time and to a marked degree, which adversely affects
educational performance:
(A) An inability to learn which cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or
health factors;
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships
with peers and teachers;
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances;
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal
or school problems.
(ii) The term includes children who are schizophrenic or autistic. The term
does not include children who are socially maladjusted, unless it is determined that
they are seriously emotionally disturbed.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.5(b)(8) (1978). It should be noted that not even the terms "schizophrenic" and
"autistic" have certain definitions.
44. "Learning disability" connotes any problem that hinders the child's ability to learn. 45
C.F.R. § 121a.5(b)(9) (1978). Under the present definition it commonly has a characteristic of
uneven learning; a child may be learning normally only in certain areas or in certain ways (e.g.,
visual memory but not aural memory). It is not uncommon to have an overlap between the
categories of "learning disability" and "emotional disturbance." However, between the two def-
initions of "specific learning disability" and "seriously emotionally disturbed," not all conditions
are named.
The only potential loophole for expanding the definition of "handicapped children" is the
definition of "include": "as used in this part, the term 'include' means that the items named are
not all of the possible items that are covered, whether like or unlike the ones named." 45
C.F.R. § 121a.6 (1978). See generally 45 C.F.R. §§121a.5(b)(8), 121a.5(b)(8)-.5(b)(9) (1978).
45. 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.5(b)(1)-5(b)(7), 5(b)(10), 5(b)(11) (1978).
46. The needs of the handicapped children could be categorized, if necessary, according to
the type of special education needed, the anticipated tenure of the special instruction, and the
physical materials needed to provide an appropriate education. If a child needed help in a
particular aspect of the learning process, that could be specified also (e.g., aural cognition).
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accurately reflect the state's success in educating all handicapped children.
Although the Act requires states to submit statistics for each disability cate-
gory,4 7 these statistics can render an incomplete picture. For example, when
the Office of Education evaluates a state in regard to its attainment of the
full educational opportunity goal, the statistics are based upon the children
who fall within the categories. The children who do not fall within these
categories may have needs which are never recognized.4 8  Therefore, the
Act should broaden the definition of "handicapped children" 4 9 by using the
term "impairment" as the basis of a common definition. Any child who has
an impairment that necessitates special education or individualized instruc-
tion should be considered a "handicaipped child" for the purposes of Public
Law 94-142.
PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE. TRADITIONAL ESSENTIALIST
CURRICULUM IN REGULAR EDUCATION
Regular education's traditional essentialist curriculum and teaching
perspective, which emphasizes content, is also a barrier to successful
mainstreaming of handicapped children. One spokesman for the essentialist
position suggests that schools are for cognitive competence, a goal to be
accomplished through a pupil's own willing efforts. 50 The implication of this
position "is that integration of handicapped children with non-handicapped
peers is unessential and thus unrelated to the primary purpose of schooling.
Special education classes, then, become the mechanism for separating
unwilling learners or children who may be perceived as interfering with
general education's goal of cognitive competence." 5 1  The essentialist's cur-
riculum, methods, and administrative approach deter the handicapped
child's smooth transition from special classes to regular classes. Special edu-
cation teachers are expected to prepare the children for traditional academic
tasks in the regular classroom while regular education teachers do little to
adapt their curriculum and methods to increase the educational success of
these children.
The potential success of Public Law 94-142 is diminished by its use of the
essentialist curriculum as the criteria to measure the performance of the
47. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.124(e)(1), 125(b)(2)(i), 127(b)(1), 132(b)(1), 184 (Comment),
121a.227(b)(2), 751(a)(2) (1978).
48. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.124-.126 (1978).
49. See note 42 supra. The definition should be as direct as the Act's intention as expressed
in the Comment to section 121a.124:
In Part B of the Act, the term "disability" is used interchangeably with "handicap-
ping condition." For consistency in this regulation, a child with a "disability" means
a child with one of the impairments listed in the definition of "handicapped chil-
dren" in § 121a.5, if the child needs special education because of the impairment.
In essence, there is a continuum of impairments. When an impairment is of such a
nature that the child needs special education, it is referred to as a disability, in
these regulations, and the child is a "handicapped" child [emphasis added].
50. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.124 (1978) (Comment); Ebel, What Are Schools For?, 54 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 3, 3-7 (1972).
51. Klein, supra note 41, at 104.
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handicapped child in the regular classroom. Nonacademic services which are
particularly crucial to the development of the handicapped child are subor-
dinate to the essentialist curriculum in the Act's organization. 5 2  To its
credit, the Act does order each public agency to provide nonacademic serv-
ices and extracurricular experiences for handicapped children,5 3 particularly
in the area of physical education. 54
The necessary revision requires specific language stating that a mainstreamed
child must receive a curriculum appropriate to his or her needs. The indi-
vidualized education program may contain specific competency goals, but
the three "R's" should not be the only goals nor should they be the only
criteria applied to determine achievement. 55 Furthermore, most children,
especially those with handicaps, do not learn different subjects at the same
rate. Therefore, the child should have individualized goals, allowing for faster
achievement in particular instructional areas. In sum, Public Law 94-142
should discourage the requirement that the mainstreamed child follow the
traditional instructional and achievement pattern.
PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE ACT RELATED
To TEACHER PREPARATION
Another barrier to collaborative functioning in the implementation of
programs in the least restrictive environment is that of inadequate prepara-
52. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.13 (1978). The nonacademic services are termed "related services."
Recreational services are given a relatively low priority in the Act's scheme. "'Recreation' in-
cludes: (i) Assessment of leisure function; (ii) Therapeutic recreation services; (iii) Recreation
programs in schools and community agencies; and (iv) Leisure education.- 45 C.F.R.
8 121a.13(9) (1978). 45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.304-.307 (1978).
53. "Each public agency shall take steps to provide nonacademic and extra-curricular serv-
ices and activities in such manner as is necessary to afford handicapped children an equal oppor-
tunity for participation in those services and activities." 45 C.F.R. § 306(a) (1978).
54. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.307 (1978). The Comment to § 121a.307 cites H.R. REP. No. 332,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1975):
The Committee expects the Commissioner of Education to take whatever ac-
tion is necessary to assure that physical education services are available to all hand-
icapped children, and has specifically included physical education within the defini-
tion of special education to make clear that the Committee expects such services,
specifically designed where necessary, to be provided as an integral part of the
educational program of every handicapped child. ,
55. 1d. See 45 C.F.R. § 121a.340-.349 (1977). To achieve the full educational opportunity
goal, subjects other than the traditional basics should be considered as ends in themselves; at
present, "side" subjects are considered a means to an end:
The use of the arts as a teaching tool for the handicapped has long been recog-
nized as a viable, effective way not only of teaching special skills, Isut also of reach-
ing youngsters who had otherwise been unteachable. The Committee envisions that
programs tinder this bill could well include an arts component and, indeed, urges
that local educational agencies include the arts in programs for the handicapped
funded tinder this Act. Such a program could cover both appreciation of the arts by
the handicapped youngsters, and the utilization of the arts as a teaching tool per se.
45 C.F.R. § 121a.304 (1978) (Comment).
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tion of teachers. The regular classroom teacher often has been characterized
as not having appropriate attitudes, knowledge, or skills to work with hand-
icapped children in the mainstream of the regular classroom. However, a
similar problem has been attributed to special education teachers. They have
limited their practical experience to special classrooms or resource rooms so
that they have an inadequate understanding and skill of how to serve the
handicapped child in a team approach or as a consultant to the regular class-
room teacher. Therefore, the key to successful mnainstreaming is the com-
bined efforts of regular class teachers, special educators, and auxiliary per-
sonnel both within the school setting and within the pre- and post-service
university setting. 56  Teachers who are not trained for the new roles and
functions required under the Act are barriers to fulfilling the mandate of the
Act.
Public Law 94-142 anticipates personnel development by requiring the
state educational agency to describe its method for personnel development
in its annual program plan.57 The Act intends to fund these development
programs, 58 but almost exclusive emphasis is placed on in-service training.5 9
The Act therefore encourages only a short, one-time program of preparation
for a regular education teacher. 60  Ongoing assistance from support person-
nel with emphasis on the particular needs and programs of the handicapped
children in the regular teacher's classroom is needed. Public Law 94-142
should provide for such continued assistance and suggest innovation in the
area of teacher preparation on both the state and local level.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESENT BARRIERS AND STATE LAW
Because Public Law 94-142 operates to finance special education programs
already operative in the states, it is important to investigate state statutes
dealing with the distribution of educational services to the handicapped.
Perhaps the three most progressive state programs for the education of the
handicapped are in Illinois, Wisconsin, and California. Although these pro-
56. Alberto, Castricane & Cohen, Mainstreaming: Implications for Training Regular Class
Teachers, 13 EDUCATION & TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 90 (1978).
57. 45 C.F.R. § 121a.139 (1978).
58. "Each application must include procedures for the implementation and use of the com-
prehensive system of personnel development established by the State educational agency under
§ 121a.140." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.224 (1978). See also 45 C.F.R. § 121a.223 (1978). See generally
45 C.F.R. §§ 121a.620-.754 (1978) (use of federal funds).
59. "Each annual program plan must include a description of programs and procedures for
the development and implementation of a comprehensive system of personnel development
which includes: (a) The inservice [sic] training of general and special educational instructional,
related services, and support personnel. ... 45 C.F.R. § 121a.380 (1978). The common defin-
ition of in-service training is local or in-state instruction lasting no more than a few days and
covering a topic or a few topics. Fortunately, Public Law No. 94-142 uses a broader definition:
"As used in this section, 'inservice training' [sic] means any training other than that received by
an individual in a full-time program which leads to a degree." 45 C.F.R. § 121a.382(a) (1978).
60. Id.
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grams partially eliminate some of the barriers to an appropriate education in
the least restrictive environment, many of the problems inherent in Public
Law 94-142 are also incorporated in the laws of these states.
Education of the Handicapped in Illinois
Illinois was one of the first states to declare a right to free appropriate
public education for each of its citizens, including the handicapped. 6 1 Yet
there is some question whether Illinois statutes actually provide a meaning-
fitl education.32
First, Article 14 still subscribes to the segregationist theory of educating
the handicapped 63 by allowing special education to control resources to be
61. In 1973, the Illinois special education statutes contained all the basics for ensuring hand-
icapped children public education:
In the field of special education, the General Assembly, during the past few
years, has created a statutory scheme which is unparalleled in the nation. Articles
14, 14A and 14B of the School Code secure to all exceptional children in Illinois
free public educational services appropriate to the needs of each. With these stat-
utes in effect, there now exist the laws needed to realize the goal expressed in the
Illinois Constitution: "... the educational development of all persons to the limits
of their capacities."
Keenan, Current Issues in Illinois School Law: The Consumer's Perspective, 23 DEPAUL L.
REV. 402, 448 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
62. E.g., Nickerson v. Thomson, 504 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1974). Nickerson was a civil rights
action alleging that the superintendent of the school district and the president and members of
the school board allocated special education resources inequitably. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the complaint, which sought declaratory
and mandatory relief, abstaining from deciding the federal issue until the state issue was de-
cided. The Seventh Circuit Court reversed and remanded on the rationale that decision of the
state issue would not resolve or affect decision of the federal issue.
Plaintiffs objected to the following problems, described in Nickerson:
The amended complaint asserts that the plaintiffs' rights have been violated
because defendants fail to fulfill the mandate of the state statutes to provide
adequate special education to physically handicapped children, maladjusted chil-
dren, children with specific learning disabilities, educable mentally handicapped
children, trainable mentally handicapped children, speech defective children, and
multiply handicapped children. According to the complaint, ten additional teachers
and other workers in various categories should have been hired in the 1972-1973
school year for special education purposes at a cost of $50,000 per year (after state
reimbursement) in order to meet the requirements of Illinois law, whereas the
Superintendent proposed to hire only two additional personnel for these programs.
The complaint further asserts that plaintiffs' Fifth and Fourteen [sic] Amend-
ment rights are violated by defendants' allocation of the resources of the special
education programs that do exist. The programs are allegedly administered in a way
that divides the children in need of special education into three groups: those who
receive adequate special education, those who receive some, but not adequate, spe-
cial education and those who receive no special education at all. Plaintiffs contend
that no rational basis is used so to divide the children.
Id. at 815 (footnote omitted).
63. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-1.01 to 14-14.01 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (Article 14). Article
14 creates a spebial education Advisory Council on Education of Handicapped Children, ap-
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used for handicapped children. Regular education receives no additional
funds for educating the handicapped except to the extent that it provides
extraordinary services or facilities. 64 Article 14 fosters the impression that
class size, special equipment, and other specifications delineated are for spe-
cial education only. 65 To insure adequate resources for the regular class-
room which cooperates with special education, these specifications should be
delineated for mainstreaming programs as well.
Second, the Article defines different types of handicapped children. 66 Just
as the distinctions are unnecessary under Public Law 94-142, they are un-
necessary under Illinois' Article 14.67 In addition, there is no discussion of
what curricula should be used in teaching handicapped children in either the
regular or special classroom. It is thus assumed that the traditional essen-
tialist curricula will be followed.
Finally, accompanying the segregationist approach is the continued prac-
tice of maintaining completely separate delivery systems. 68  Generally, the
pointed by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Id. at § 14-3.01. The Superintendent and
Council cooperate in developing appropriate rules and regulations.
School boards are encouraged to maintain special educational facilities for handicapped
children. Id. at §§ 14-4.01 to -6.01. There is no comparable provision encouraging mainstream-
ing. In fact, a school district gains reimbursement for special education building purposes if it
presents the proper vouchers. Id. at §§ 14-13.02 to -14.01. There is also reimbursement for the
costs of special education, which could have a liberal construction inclusive of supportive serv-
ices for mainstreamed children. Id. at § 14-12.01. See also id. at 9§ 14-13.01 (reimbursement
for furnishing special educational facilities in a recognized school).
64. The use of the word "extraordinary" is particularly interesting. There is no statutory
explanation of the method for determining what is "extraordinary." Id. at § 14-7.02a.
A school district providing for a child requiring extraordinary special education
services because of the nature of his handicap is eligible for reimbursement from
the State for the per capita cost of educating that child in excess of the district per
capita tuition charge for the prior year or $2,000, whichever is less. Per capita costs
shall be expenditures minus State reimbursement under Section 14-13.01.
Id. A school district maintaining special education classes for children in orphanages, foster
family homes, children's homes, or state housing units gets reimbursement, too. Id. at § 14-7.03.
65. See note 70 infra.
The Superintendent of Public Instruction with the advice of the Advisory Council
shall prescribe the standards and make the necessary rules and regulations including
but not limited to establishment of classes, training requirements of teachers and
other personnel, eligibility and admission of pupils, the curriculum, class size limi-
tation, building programs, housing, transportation, special equipment and instruc-
tional supplies, and the applications for claims for reimbursements.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 (Smith-Hurd 1978). This provision is the most adaptable for
promoting the concept of mainstreaming. The Superintendent has sufficient power under this
provision to make standards pushing state educational practices in the right direction.
66. See, e.g., id. at §§ 14-1.01 to -1.04 (physically handicapped children, maladjusted chil-
dren, children with specific learning disabilities, and educable mentally handicapped children).
Because the categories of handicapped children are established at the beginning of the Article,
the rest of Article 14 relates back to those categories. See id. at § 14-7.01. See also id. at
9 14-13.01 (distinction in reimbursement for an apparent practical purpose).
67. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 65 supra (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 14-8.01 is sufficiently adaptable). Con-
tinual reference is made to special education programs. See, e.g., id. at §§ 14-3.01. -6.01,
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Article emphasizes extraordinary special education services and de-em-
phasizes the new concept and requirement of mainstreaming. 69 Moreover,
the Illinois Superintendent of Public Instruction can prescribe the require-
ments needed by teachers of handicapped children. 70  The Superintendent
should require stricter qualifications and specialized training in addition to
the in-service training mentioned in Public Law 94-142. 7 1
Education of the Handicapped in Wisconsin
Wisconsin is another state which has traditionally led the country in edu-
cational reforms. Its exemplar Chapter 115 contains guarantees of free ap-
propriate public education for the handicapped, those with special educa-
tional needs clue to social and economic factors, and those making a
transition between two languages and cultures. 72  The Chapter does contain
some problem areas, however, which indicate present barriers in implementation.
First, there are specific financial grants for educational facilities and re-
sources to benefit the handicapped. 73  Theoretically, those grants would
-7.02a, -7.03, -9.01. There is no indication that the special education programs include those
performed in regular education settings.
The deaf/blind individuals are entitled to use of the service center operated by the Illinois
Office of Education. Id. at § 14-11.02. Special educational materials are provided for handi-
capped students. Id. at § 14.11.01. The tenure of the handicapped individual's right to special
educational services is generally 3-21 years of age throughout Article 14. See, e.g., id. at §§
14-1.04, -11.02. One can argue that there is an equal protection problem, because regular
education rights generally run from 5-18 years of age.
69. See note 66 supra.
70. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 14-8.01, -9.01 (Smith-Hurd 1978). "No person shall be
employed to teach any class or program authorized by this Article who does not hold a valid
teacher's certificate as provided by law and unless 'he has had such special training as the
Superintendent of Public Instruction may require." Id. at § 14-9.01.
71. Id. at § 3-11 (institutes or inservice training workshops). See also id. at § 14-10.01
(traineeship and fellowship program).
72. See generally Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.76-.895 (Children with Exceptional Educational
Needs), 90-.94 (Special Educational Needs), 95-.996 (Bilingual-Bicultural Education) (West
1978).
73. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction collects any federal aid as an agent. Id.
at § 115.28(9). The federal aid then can be distributed to various school boards. All blind and
deaf residents are entitled to education free of charge. Id. at § 115.52. There is a special circulat-
ing collection of books available to the visually handicapped. Id. at § 115.55.
Perhaps most obvious are the responsibilities of the Division of Handicapped Children -
limited to supervising the special education expenditures and programs. Id. at § 115.77. The
Division "[sihall audit expenditures incurred for children with exceptional educational needs."
Id. at § 115.77(2)(b). The Division also helps develop special education programs, approves
programs, and approves plans to discontinue special education programs. Id. at 9 115.77 (4).
"Any federal aid which is made available for special education programs shall be granted the
division for carrying out plans approved by the federal agency having supervision of the aid
program." Id. at § 115.77(5). That might well include all of the Public Law 94-142 funding. See 20
U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1402, 1411-20 (1976).
It is also notable that the State Superintendent must make a state annual plan for state as
well as federal purposes. Id. at § 115.78. That plan must include: "[a] listing of all public and
private special education programs available in this state, the number of children attending each
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benefit handicapped children in regular education environments; yet that is
not at all clear. In practice, monies go directly to the Division for Handi-
capped Children, 74 which then distributes the funds to special education pro-
grams and personnel who specizalize in this field. 75  Significantly, the funds
are earmarked "special education," which minimizes the possibility that they
might be shared with regular education.
Second, Chapter 115 defines even more categories of handicapped stu-
dents than Illinois' Article 14.76 Like most statutes, Chapter 115 carries
those definitions throughout, which determines the construction and applica-
tion of the Chapter. 77  Further, the definition of "regular education"
excludes children with exceptional educational needs. 78  Therefore, when a
handicapped child is mainstreamed, any assistance or special education ren-
dered by the regular classroom teacher would have to be characterized
special education program pursuant to s. 115.85(2) or supervised under s. 115.77(3)(d) and the
state aid given to each program so attended or supervised." Id. at § 115.78(2). It is unclear
whether and to what extent a mainstreamed child is a participant in a special education pro-
gram. But see id. at §§ 115.83(1)(b), (2).
74. See note 73 supra.
75. The board for the school district has the power to employ, for a special education pro-
grain: "either full- or part-time certified teachers, certified coordinators of special education,
certified school social workers, certified school psychologists, paraprofessionals, certified consult-
ing teachers to work with any teacher of regular education programs who has a child with
exceptional educational needs in a class . I..." Id  at § 115.83(1)(b).
76. See note 66 supra. Section 115.76(3) of the Wisconsin Statutes lists:
(a) Physical * * * or orthopedic disability.
(b) Mental retardation or other developmental disabilities.
(c) Hearing impairment.
(d) Visual disability.
(e) Speech or language disability.
(f) Emotional disturbance.
(g) Learning disability.
(h) Pregnancy, including up to 2 months after the birth of the child or other termi-
nation of the pregnancy.
(i) Any combination of conditions named by the state superintendent or enumerated
in pars. (a) to (h).
77. See, e.g., id. at § 115.85(3):
Annually, on or before August 15, each school board shall report to the department
such inlbrmation as it requires, including the following:
(a) The total number of children who reside in the district and who have been
placed in. special education programs under s. 115.85(2), the exceptional educational
needs of each such child and the school attended or special education received by
each such child. The report shall also specify the number of children with excep-
tional educational needs who are known to the school district and who are under
the age of 3 years and the exceptional educational needs of each such child (em-
phasis added). Naming the exceptional education needs of the child is direct and
could avoid unnecessary labels. However, it is more than likely that the school
boards revert to the method of describing the needs of the child with the traditional
labels, thus describing the child's handicaps rather than the resulting exceptional
education needs.
78. "'Regular education' means the educational program provided by a public or private
school for children who do not have exceptional educational needs." Wis. STAT.* § 115.76(9)
(1977). But see id. at § 115.76(10) ("supportive or related service").
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either as regular or special education before the source of funding could be
determined. 79  By definition, there is bound to be bureaucratic confusion
and potential disagreement.
Another problem is that various entities, including the Division for Hand-
icapped Children, the Council on Exceptional Education, and other special
education programs, all concentrate on special education without reference
to mainstreaming1 0  Their ability to coordinate special education programs
with regular classroom activities or to assume responsibility for mainstream-
79. See id. (overlapping definitions of "special education" and "regular education"). In re-
gard to the content of the education, the definition of "educational assessment" refers to "fun-
damental course areas" for the evaluation of the success of the educational services. The Wis-
consin Superintendent of Public Instruction has the duty to:
Develop an educational assessment program to measure objectively the adequacy
and efficiency of educational programs offered by public schools in this state. The
program shall include, without limitation because of enumeration, methods by
which pupil achievement in fundamental course areas, as set forth in s. 188.01(1),
and other areas of instruction commonly offered by public schools, will be objec-
tively measured each year. Assessment shall be undertaken at several grade levels
on a uniform, state-wide basis.
Id. at § 115.28(10). The Superintendent could use this provision for expansive and progressive
regulations and educational evaluation criteria.
80. The Superintendent of Public Instruction has multiple duties, but none of them speak to
insuring mainstreaming. Id. at §§ 115.28(1)-(15). See also id. at §§ 115.29-.30. "The state superin-
tendent may: (1) Provide for the education of deaf-blind children of suitable capacity to receive
instruction .. . in a special class for that purpose ...."Id. at § 115.53. There are also special
Wisconsin schools for the visually handicapped and the deaf. Id. at § 115.52.
The Division for Handicapped Children operates under the Superintendent. Id. at
§§ 115.77(1), (2).
The division shall be responsible for:
(a) Services for children with exceptional educational needs who are under the
jurisdiction of the state superintendent and for the Wisconsin school for the deaf
and the Wisconsin school for the visually handicapped....
(c) Services provided to children with exceptional educational needs by special
education programs under s. 115.85(2) ...
Id. at § 115.77(3). See generally id. at § 115.77(4). The discussion of the Division's responsibil-
ity in the administration of special education programs does not explicitly or implicitly refer to
public education in the regular classroom.
The Superintendent is also responsible for the state educational plan. See id. at § 115.78
Here, again, the emphasis lies in special educational programs; however, the Superintendent
could construe them to include regular class programs involving one or more children with
exceptional educational needs. See id. at § 115.78(2). The Council on Exceptional Education
advises the Superintendent on those same special education programs. Id. at § 115.79. The
most directly affected entity, though, is the child with exceptional educational needs. That child
must be identified and recommended for a special education program. Id. at § 115.80(3). See
also id. at §§ 115.82 (compulsory attendance) .83 (authorization of special education programs and
services). But see id. at §§ 115.83(2) (definition of "special education program" includes a pro-
gram that allows a child to attend "regular education programs"); 1973 Wis. LAWs, ch. 258, § 1.
Section 1 of chapter 258 of the 1973 Wisconsin Laws stated:
It is the intent of the legislature in this act to ensure that preference is given,
whenever appropriate, to education of a child with exceptional educational needs in
classes along with children who do not have such needs. Furthermore, the legisla-
ture recognizes that it is frequently in the best interest of a child with exceptional
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ing will depend upon a full exercise of authority. The supervision of present
programs, however, could involve a great deal of time, to the detriment of
the adaptation and development of those programs. To achieve mainstream-
ing, either the laws or the regulations must place it as a central goal to
insure that it is not overlooked.
Finally, there are vague requirements for teacher preparation in the stat-
ute. 81  But there are no particular provisions which give guidance for the
preparation of the regular classroom teacher. 8 2  Therefore, appropriate
methods of regular teacher training must still be devised and supported by
the Superintendent and associated boards.
Education of the Handicapped in California
California is a third state that recently overhauled its special educational
statutes. 83  Unfortunately, the new statutes contain most of the old problems.
First, the provisions governing special education programs are encumbered
by the traditional funding barrier which assumes that money will go directly
to special education programs.84 Second, the provisions refer to general
categories of "handicapped children" needing special education programs,
defining them according to their handicaps rather than their resulting educa-
tional needs.8 5 Third, the measurement of successful education efforts by
the state follows the traditional essentialist curriculum, regardless of whether
the child is taught in the regular or special classroom. 86  Fourth, the prob-
lems inherent in the funding barrier are compounded by the separate regu-
educational needs to be educated in an environment as similar as possible to the
educational environment surrounding his siblings and neighbors who do not have
such needs.
81. See, e.g., id. at §§ 115.28(7) (licensing and certification), .77(3)(d)(3) Division for Handi-
capped Children recommendations for certification standards, .77(4)(f) (Division for Handicapped
Children duty to develop program for preparation, recruitment, and in-service training of per-
sonnel), .78(3) (state plan description of personnel mad facilities available), .83(1)(b) (school board
authority to employ specially trained personnel), .83(1)(c) (school board authority to provide
in-service training).
82. It can be deduced that regular classroom teachers could learn from the in-service train-
ing. There is question as to whether in-service training is adequate or the only appropriate
method of training regular education teachers.
83. California revised and reorganized its entire Education Code. Its history is outlined in
E. KUNZI, THE CALIFORNIA EDUCATION CODE 11, 13, 18, 22 (1978) (references to the im-
proved provision of public education for the handicapped). [hereinafter cited as KUNZ]].
84. See generally CAL. [EDuC.] CODE §§ 56000-56160 (West 1977).
85. The Education Code defines "physically handicapped pupils," "mentally retarded
pupils," "severely mentally retarded pupils," "educationally handicapped pupils," and "'multi-
handicapped pupils." Id. at § 56000. The California voucher system relies on similar definitions.
See EDUCATIONAL POLICY, sunpra note 16, at 717 (tinder prior reimbursement scheme).
86. But see CAL. [EDUC.] CODE §§ 56020-56042 (West 1977). Section 56020 on experimen-
tal programs is particularly progressive, because it explicitly encourages innovation throughout
the state.
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lar and special education delivery systems. 87 And last, there is extensive
discussion of teacher preparation, but it is geared to funding practices for
teachers of children with specific handicaps. 88 Thus, the evolution of the
California Education Code is not yet complete.8 9
An examination of these state laws reveals that, despite the federal legisla-
tion which purports to provide a free and appropriate public school educa-
tion to all handicapped children, such a commitment will not itself insure
the desired outcome. The state laws and the Federal Act have not provided
the mechanisms which will encourage and reinforce efforts in collaborative
programming for the handicapped by special educators and the regular class-
room teachers.
RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM
In an attempt to remove or at least limit the effects of the barriers to
collaborative programming in the least restrictive environment between reg-
ular and special education, the following suggestions are made.
First, Congress and state legislatures should provide resources for the
education of handicapped children on a proportionate basis in order to limit
the control exerted by special education systems over excess funds. To
achieve this basis, a suggested approach is the use of a weighted index which
would accommodate the needs of exceptional children. 90 It must be noted
that adjustments of the index must be made to avoid the traditional
categories for exceptional children since the present "weighted index sys-
tems may not be appropriate given the philosophy and stated intent under
the federal law of serving handicapped populations in the 'least restrictive
87. The statutes draw obvious lines between various special education programs, including
occupational training for physically handicapped and mentally retarded pupils and sheltered
workshops. See id. at §§ 56070-56076. See generally EDUCATIONAL POLICY, supra note 16, at 715,
717.
88. See, e.g., CAL. [EDuC.] CODE §§ 56050-56064 (West 1977) (grants to teachers of physi-
cally handicapped or mentally retarded pupils; loans to educationally handicapped pupils).
89. The California Education Code has continually changed and expanded for over a cen-
tury. See generally KUNZI, supra note 83. In the area of education of the handicapped, at least,
the needed changes are not complete.
Those changes are needed generally across the United States. See T. VAN GEEL, AUTHOR-
ITY TO CONTROL THE SCHOOL PROGRAM (1976); Herr, Rights into Action: Protecting Human
Rights of the Mentally Handicapped, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 203 (1977); Jackson, The Little Red
Schoolhouse is No More: Due Process Comes to Public Education, 13 IDAHO L. REX'. 325 (1977);
Letwin, After Goss v. Lopez: Student Status as Suspect Classification?, in Symposium, Perspec-
tives on the Post-Civil War Amendments, 29 STAN. L. REV. 627 (1977); Comment, Special
Education: The Struggle for Equal Education Opportunity in Iowa, 62 IOWA L. REv'. 1283
(1977). See also P. MANN, SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR HANDICAPPED STUDENTS (1978).
90. See generally R. ROSSMILLER, J. HALE & L. FROIIREICH, EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS
FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN: RESOURCE CONFIGURATIONS AND COSTS, NATIONAL EDUCA-
TIONAL FINANCE PROJECT, Madison, Wis. (Special Study No. 2, 1970). These authors have
documented the excess cost of special education delivery. Their study used a weighted index
approach (1.0 = regular program cost) and found special education costs across ten categorical
areas to vary from 1.14 to 3.64 in terms of weighted costs.
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alternative' placeiment." 9 1 Once the resources were available, they could
then be allocated to either delivery system based on the requirements of the
children. If both delivery systems simultaneously required funds, the finance
committee of the appropriate school district could develop a formula to
equitably allocate the funds. This would foster full participation of both regu-
lar and special education in the multidisciplinary team process. The team
would have the requisite freedom to make recommendations for program-
ruing based on the children's needs, irrespective of the biases of one deliv-
ery system over the other.
Second, the harmful effect of "labeling" a handicapped child could be eas-
ily eliminated if congressional and legislative bodies would provide alternate
methods of funding handicapped education without the use of categories.
Categories should be retained only if they could be directly useful in educa-
tional programming. Other than this exception, handicapped children should
be identified and programmed for on the basis of assessed learning and
treatment needs.
Third, regular education should adopt a more moderate curricular position
so that different options in meeting academic objectives would be available.
Schools that want to implement the provision of curricular alternatives for
least restrictive environment programming, should include choices of: life
science, creative arts, vocational preparation, practical living skills, and
experiential cultural studies. Basic skill development and general content
knowledge also should be incorporated in these curricular areas. Further,
depending upon the learning model utilized, areas such as inductive reason-
ing, symbolic language development, and problemin-solving could be added.
The aptitudes, interests, and specific needs of the pupils would guide the
teacher in selecting the most appropriate model or process. 92
Thus, as a part of the resolution of this barrier, regular education needs to
apply the "ecology of education" to both its curriculum and its classrooms.
One educator recommends that "relationships between the characteristics of
learners and the surroundings in which they live . . . [and] the relationships
and inter-connections that exist between these environments" should be
studied in the classroom arena. 93 This would be a move away from, and
would go beyond, a concern for just the skills and knowledge of particular
subject areas. The teacher's attention would be drawn to the manner in
which children interact in the process of learning. From this, the discovery of
91. Yates, Financing of Public Law 94-142, 12 EDUCATION & TRAININC OF THE MENTALLY
RETARDED 396, 398 (1977).
92. See Klein, supra note 41, at 111.
93. Bronfenbrenner, The Experimental Ecology of Education, 5 EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER
5 (1976). This author is a widely recognized general educator who writes with great breadth
regarding general education, and views learners as interactors with their environments in the
process of learning. This is a less limited view than that of the essentialists, who are bent on the
learning of primary skills.
[Vol. 28:321
EDUCATION FOR THE HANDICAPPED
elements for learning which effectively mesh in the educational setting
could result in achievement for both handicapped and nonhandicapped chil-
dren in the regular classroom.
Fourth, to provide integrative programming to meet the least restrictive
environment mandate of Public Law 94-142, a unified administrative struc-
ture is required to function collaboratively between the two delivery sys-
tems. Also needed is an "integrated system plan" that demands adaptation of
all main and supporting systems. "[T]he burden for adaptation, which previ-
ously had rested unproportionately upon the child, now shifts to the system.
The child is responsible only as one aspect of the environment comprising
the system." 9 4 The modification of mainstream education, plus a support
system that provides leadership, expertise, mechanisms, and resources is
necessary to create a new kind of regular education program that is more
responsive to the individual needs of all children. This will demand a re-
sponsive unified administrative structure that relates to the needs of both
handicapped and nonhandicapped children.
It may be that, in time, the walls between regular and special education
will diminish as larger numbers of children move into less restrictive envi-
ronments. Special education will become more significant in regular educa-
tion as it assumes a greater consultative team-teaching role in the regular
classroom, where the largest share of direct teaching will occur.
95
Fifth, the one area in which aggressive measures are being taken to re-
solve the problem and remove the barrier is in teacher preparation. The
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped has been allocating sizeable
amounts of funds since fiscal year 1974 for the training and retraining of
teachers. Training teachers to deal with a collaborative system is imperative
since each child's least restrictive environment is dependent upon successful
implementation of his or her individualized education program.9 6 Signifi-
cance has been placed on this area by teachers' and citizens' organizations.
The National Education Association has said that "[a]ll staff should be
adequately prepared for their roles through in-service training and retrain-
ing. ' ' 7 In light of the task at hand, all educators need to refine and expand
current teaching methods. Improvements in both pre-service and in-service
instruction is occurring in many quarters, and these programs are providing
the greatest innovation for teachers in the field.
Some of the slowest progress toward interfacing regular and special educa-
tion teacher preparation is seen on university and college campuses where
the programs are separated by departments or schools. This is a sad com-
mentary on higher educational institutions which ought to be leading the
way with models of integrated programming. To resolve this problem, in-
94. MEISGEIER, supra note 11, at 137.
95. See Hasazi & York, Changing Concepts of Special Education, 95 TEACHER 99, 100
(1977).
96. Harvey, Legislative Intent and Progress, 44 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 234, 261 (1978).
97. Ryor, Integrating the Handicapped, 66 TODAY'S EDUCATION 24, 25 (1977).
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stitutional leadership should provide resource incentives to those campuses
that become more aggressive in unifying their curricula and faculties. This
should be achieved through the preparation of teachers who will obtain the
competencies and skills necessary to function effectively in their roles with
both nonhandicapped and handicapped children in today's classrooms.
